Bayesian consistent prior selection by Christopher P. Chambers & Takashi Hayashi Yzx
Bayesian consistent prior selection
Christopher P. Chambers￿and Takashi Hayashiyz x
August 2005
Abstract
A subjective expected utility agent is given information about the state
of the world in the form of a set of possible priors. She is allowed to con-
dition her prior on this information. A set of priors may be updated
according to Bayes￿rule, prior-by-prior, upon learning that some state of
the world has not obtained. We show that there exists no decision maker
who obeys Bayes￿rule, conditions her prior on the available information
(by selecting a prior in the announced set), and who updates the infor-
mation prior-by-prior using Bayes￿rule. The result implies that at least
one of several familiar decision theoretic ￿paradoxes￿is a mathematical
necessity.
1 Introduction
The classical theories of Savage [16] and Anscombe and Aumann [2] serve to
provide behavioral foundations in environments of subjective uncertainty justi-
fying the hypothesis of subjective expected utility. An agent whose behavior
conforms to the axioms of either model can be viewed as if she perceives uncer-
tainty in a probabilistic sense. Thus, she attributes some probability measure
to the set of states of the world, and evaluates state-contingent payo⁄s in an
expected utility fashion, with respect to this probability measure. The theories
are very elegant and the behavioral conditions posited are quite intuitive. How-
ever, a signi￿cant gap in the theory is that it provides no method of specifying
how such a probability measure should be formed.
Recently, several models have been proposed which attempt to ￿ll this gap.
One example is the case-based decision theory of Gilboa and Schmeidler [12].
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1In this model, past experiences of the decision maker are explicitly modelled and
incorporated in the formation of a prior. Other models assume the decision
maker is given some information about the true state of the world, in the form
of a set of priors (for example, see Ahn [1], Damiano [3], Gajdos et al. [8, 9],
Hayashi [13], Klibano⁄ et al. [14], and Stinchcombe [18]). The decision-maker
is given the information that the ￿true￿prior lies in some possible set. She is
then allowed to form a subjective probability which depends on this information.
This is the approach we follow.
To understand this approach, recall the classical Ellsberg paradox [4]. An
urn contains balls of many colors. The decision maker is told that the com-
position (relative proportions of colors) of the balls in the urn lies within some
set, but is told nothing else. A ball is drawn, and the state of the world is the
color of ball drawn. A composition of balls in an urn is identi￿ed with a proba-
bility measure over the states. The idea is that the decision maker￿ s subjective
probability over the states of the world can depend on the information she is
given.
Our primary result in this note demonstrates a fundamental con￿ ict in such
a model. Informally speaking, we establish that any subjective expected utility
agent who obeys Bayes￿rule cannot reasonably condition her subjective proba-
bility on the information given to her. More speci￿cally, we take ￿reasonable￿
to mean that if the set of priors revealed to the agent is both closed and convex,
then the agent is required to select a subjective probability from this set.
To understand the result more concretely, return to the Ellsberg urn exam-
ple. Suppose there are three colors of balls in an urn, say, red, blue and, green.
The decision maker is told that the composition of balls lies within some set,
and she constructs a subjective probability over the states (colors) as a function
of this information. Now, suppose that it is revealed to the decision maker that
all green balls have been removed from the urn. This is equivalent to being told
that the state of the world is not green, so the decision maker should naturally
update her subjective probability according to Bayes￿rule (conditioning on the
event that red or blue occurs). Moreover, the decision maker￿ s objective infor-
mation has also clearly changed. For any possible composition of balls that the
decision maker was originally given, the composition has changed so that there
are no green balls. Viewing a composition as a probability, the new compositon
is simply the Bayes￿update of the original probability conditional on the event
that the green state did not obtain. Thus, the decision maker possesses an
information set now which is the prior-by-prior update of the original informa-
tion set (the new set consists of the set of Bayesian updates of the priors in the
original set).
It is important to stress here that the set of priors models objective infor-
mation. Prior-by-prior updating is totally objective in this environment. This
stands in stark contrast to models which feature a set of subjective priors, where
di⁄erent subjective updating rules have been proposed (see, for example, Gilboa
and Schmeidler [11]).
We require that the Bayesian update of the decision maker￿ s original prior in
this environment is exactly the prior she would have selected had she originally
2been told the updated set of priors. A decision maker who behaves in such a
way always looks ahead, considering what she would do if one or more states
does not obtain. A decision maker who does not behave in this way faces two
situations with identical information, and treats them di⁄erently depending on
how she arrived at the information.
The impossibility result demonstrates that such a decision maker does not
exist. It is impossible for a subjective expected utility decision maker to obey
Bayes￿rule, always select a prior from the information set given to her, and al-
ways treat situations independently of how she arrived at them. Thus, we estab-
lish that all decision makers must violate one of the principles speci￿ed above.
We believe this provides a mathematical argument explaining the prevalence of
various decision-theoretic paradoxes (the Ellsberg paradox, non-Bayesian up-
dating). All decision makers must exhibit behavior that can be described as
￿paradoxical,￿at least according to a subjective expected utilty standpoint.
Section 2 discusses and proves the main theorem. Section 3 discusses the
implications of the result and concludes. An Appendix extends the analysis
to an environment in which decision makers are allowed to make set-valued
selections. The results in this environment are surprisingly not much more
promising.
2 The model and primary result
Let ￿ be a ￿nite set of states of the world. For any nonempty subset E ￿ ￿,
the set of probability measures over E is denoted ￿(E). The set of all convex
and compact subsets of ￿(E) is denoted P (E). The set of all convex and
compact subsets of ￿(E) consisting only of measures having full support on E
is denoted Pfs (E).
A prior selection problem consists of a nonempty subset of ￿, say, E,
and a set P 2 P (E). The domain of all prior selection problems will be written
X, and the domain of all prior selection problems (E;P) for which P 2 Pfs (E)
is denoted X fs.
A prior selection rule is a function   : X !
S
E22￿n? ￿(E), such that for
all (E;P) 2 X,   (E;P) 2 P. A full support prior selection rule takes as
domain X fs. We generalize the notion of a prior selection rule in the appendix,
in order to accommodate the possibility of an agent who selects a set of priors.
Our main interest is in studying the prior-by-prior updating rule for sets
of priors, and in understanding when a prior selection rule is consistent with
respect to Bayesian updating. To this end, we will be concerned only with full
support prior selection rules (so as not to worry about the case in which one
must update on a set of probability zero). Thus, for all nonempty E ￿ ￿, and
for all nonempty F ￿ E, for all P ￿ Pfs (E), the set PF ￿ Pfs (F) is given by
PF ￿
￿
p
p(F)
j2F : p 2 P
￿
:
3Hence, PF is simply that set of probabilities that results from updating P prior-
by-prior.
A full support prior selection rule is Bayesian consistent if for all (E;P) 2
X fs, and for all nonempty F ￿ E,  
￿
F;PF￿
(￿) =   (E;P)(￿jF). In other
words, the prior selected when information about the state is revealed is simply
the Bayesian update of the originally selected prior.
The primary purpose of this note is to establish that there exists no full
support prior selection rule satisfying Bayesian consistency.
Theorem: Suppose that j￿j ￿ 3. Then there exists no Bayesian consistent
full support prior selection rule.
Proof. Let E ￿ ￿ such that jEj = 3. Without loss of generality, label
E ￿ fa;b;cg. We will construct four elements of Pfs (E) These four sets are
illustrated in Figure 1 1. Here, conv denotes the convex hull). To do so, we
need to de￿ne some preliminary elements of ￿(E). De￿ne
￿
pi￿6
i=1 as follows:
a b c
p1 3=13 9=13 1=13
p2 3=7 3=7 1=7
p3 1=5 3=5 1=5
p4 1=3 1=3 1=3
p5 3=5 1=5 1=5
p6 3=7 1=7 3=7
:
We de￿ne the following elements of P (E).
P1 ￿ conv
￿
p1;p2;p3￿
;
P2 ￿ conv
￿
p2;p3;p4￿
;
P3 ￿ conv
￿
p2;p4;p5￿
;
P4 ￿ conv
￿
p4;p5;p6￿
:
Consider the problems (E;P1);(E;P2);(E;P3);(E;P4) ￿ X fs. We claim that
P1 \ P4 = ?. This is obvious; for all p 2 P1, p(b) ￿ 3p(c). However, for all
p 2 P4, p(c) ￿ p(b).
We will now establish that   (E;P1) =   (E;P4), which is a contradiction.
The argument is very geometric, so we will illustrate the ￿rst step in Figure
2 2.
Let p￿ =   (E;P1). Clearly, P
fa;bg
1 =
conv
￿
p1 (￿jfa;bg);p2 (￿jfa;bg);p3 (￿jfa;bg)
￿
and P
fa;cg
1 =
conv
￿
p1 (￿jfa;cg);p2 (￿jfa;cg);p3 (￿jfa;cg)
￿
. By Bayesian consistency,
 
￿
fa;bg;P
fa;bg
1
￿
(￿) = p￿ (￿jfa;bg) and  
￿
fa;cg;P
fa;cg
1
￿
(￿) = p￿ (￿jfa;cg).
The shaded lines on the faces of the simplex on Figure 2 are P
fa;bg
1 and
P
fa;cg
1 . In particular, this illustrates geometrically how to ￿nd the Bayesian
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Figure 1: Information sets
update of an information set. It is a projection of the information set onto the
corresponding face of the simplex from the opposite vertex.
But note that P
fa;bg
2 = P
fa;bg
1 and that P
fa;cg
2 = P
fa;cg
1 . (This is also
cleary visible from Figure 2). Therefore,  
￿
fa;bg;P
fa;bg
2
￿
(￿) = p￿ (￿jfa;bg)
and  
￿
fa;cg;P
fa;cg
2
￿
(￿) = p￿ (￿jfa;cg). Let p￿￿ =   (E;P2). By Bayesian
consistency, p￿￿ (￿jfa;bg) = p￿ (￿jfa;bg) and p￿￿ (￿jfa;cg) = p￿ (￿jfa;cg). But
this is only possible if p￿￿ = p￿. Hence, we conclude that   (E;P2) =   (E;P1),
and it has to lie on the facet on which P1 and P2 intersect.
The remainder of the proof lies in establishing that   (E;P3) =   (E;P2)
and that   (E;P4) =   (E;P3). That   (E;P3) =   (E;P2) follows from the
fact that P
fa;cg
3 = P
fa;cg
2 and P
fb;cg
3 = P
fb;cg
2 , and an identical argument using
Bayesian consistency, and it has to be the point at which P1, P2, P3 intersect.
That   (E;P4) =   (E;P3) follows from the fact that P
fa;bg
4 = P
fa;bg
3 and
P
fa;cg
4 = P
fa;cg
3 , and an identical argument using Bayesian consistency. Hence,
  (E;P4) =   (E;P1), which demonstrates the existence of p￿ 2 P1 \ P4, a
contradiction. ￿
3 Discussion and conclusion
Our impossibility result demonstrates that there can be no Bayesian consistent
prior selection rule. But what does this really mean for the theory? As we
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Figure 2: Constructing Bayesian updates of information sets
see it, it demonstrates the impossibility of the conjunction of several principles
taken all at once. The primary point of this note is to demonstrate that one of
these principles must be violated.
What are these principles? The ￿rst is the subjective expected utility hy-
pothesis. The second is the selection hypothesis. The third is the dynamic
consistency hypothesis. The fourth we shall refer to as the history indepen-
dence hypothesis. Our claim is that at least one of these principles must be
violated for any decision maker. We discuss each of these principles in turn.
3.1 The subjective expected utility hypothesis
Our model relies on the assumption that the decision maker obeys the axioms
of subjective expected utility. There are many models which have been de-
veloped generalizing subjective expected utility (for example, see Gilboa and
Schmeidler [10] and Schmeidler [17]). These models are originally developed
to accommodate the ￿Ellsberg paradox.￿ The Ellsberg paradox demonstrates
a type of nonseparability in beliefs. One version of the paradox works like
this: An urn is ￿lled with three colors of balls. They are colored either blue,
green, or red. Two-thirds of the balls are either blue or green, and one third
is red. A decision maker is o⁄ered a choice between a bet on the draw of a
blue or green ball or a bet on the draw of a red or green ball. Many decision
makers prefer the ￿rst bet, as the total proportion of blue and green balls is
known. However, when o⁄ered a choice between a bet on the draw of a blue
6ball or on the bet on the draw of a red ball, many decision makers would prefer
the second bet But such a decision maker cannot conform to the subjective
expected utility axioms. Of course, an agent who does not even select a prior
violates the most basic of our assumptions. Hence, such a decision maker is
not ruled out by our other axioms. However, in the appendix, we show that an
agent whose behavior conforms to the multiple priors model [10] and who uses
a prior-by-prior updating rule also cannot exist, at least when she always makes
a nontrivial selection from the information set given to her.
3.2 The selection hypothesis
The next possibility we mention is the idea that a decision maker need not select
a prior belonging to the set of priors that is revealed to her. While this is of
course possible, for a ￿rational￿decision maker, some very mild requirements
on behavior will rule this out. Suppose that the utility index of a decision
maker is a¢ ne (one can do this in the Anscombe-Aumann theory) and that the
decision maker￿ s behavior satis￿es the following. For every possible prior in the
information set, the expectation of a given bet is greater than zero. If she would
always accept such a bet under her subjective prior, then a simple separation
argument establishes that she must select a prior from the information given to
her. Nevertheless, a decision maker who does not always select a prior from the
information set o⁄ered to her is not ruled out by our remaining assumptions.
3.3 The dynamic consistency hypothesis (Bayesian updat-
ing)
What about an expected utility agent who does not update her prior in a
Bayesian fashion? Indeed, this is again observed often in the experimental
literature, and a new theoretical literature has risen up to explain this type of
behavior (see Epstein [5] and Epstein et al. [7]). Bayesian updating and dy-
namic consistency are implicit in many axiomatizations of subjective expected
utility (see for example, Epstein and LeBreton [6]) Nevertheless, an agent who
does not update her prior according to Bayes￿rule escapes the impossibility
result.
3.4 The history independence hypothesis
We lastly discuss the idea of history independence built into our model. Start-
ing from a particular set of states, when a certain state is ruled out, the decision
maker is not allowed to take into consideration the original problem being faced.
Thus, two information sets whose Bayesian updates induce the same new infor-
mation set are treated equivalently after updating. Independence of this type is
implicit in the decision maker. Non-expected utility models suggest that it may
be normatively sound to allow decisions to depend on the original information
set before updating (see, for example, Machina [15], who expounds upon the
argument in an objective setting). Thus, the only remaining way to avoid our
7impossibility result is to allow the choice of a prior to depend nontrivially on
any original information set faced in the past. As mentioned in the introduc-
tion, a decision maker of this type may face two situations which are identical in
their information, but behave di⁄erently depending on how she arrived at this
information.
3.5 Conclusion
All of the preceding types of behavior have been discussed before in the liter-
ature. Each of them has been recognized by decision theorists, and argued
both experimentally and normatively for many years. What is new here is
the mathematical necessity of behavior of one of the preceding types. In the
Appendix, we show that the situation does not change much when moving to
the multiple priors model with prior-by-prior updating. While multiple priors
decision makers exist that are Bayesian consistent, such decision makers exhibit
pathological behavior. For a large class of information sets (including those
which are the convex hulls of two priors), such a decision maker is not allowed
to make any kind of subjective judgment. Her set of subjective priors must
coincide with the objective information given to her. This is a powerful state-
ment about the behavior of decision makers facing objective information in the
form of a set of priors. Such a decision maker, when facing certain sets, is
required to use the objective information as subjective information. Note that
the setup of the standard Ellsberg paradox mentioned above is the convex hull
of two priors, so this is in the realm of our corollary (up to some modi￿cation￿ we
have worked throughout with probability measures with full support in order to
make our results more powerful. The classical Ellsberg paradox uses an infor-
mation set that includes probability measures without full support. However,
the argument is easily extended to such information sets).
4 Appendix: Set-valued selections
When set-valued selections are allowed, obviously the identity mapping is
Bayesian consistent. However, below we show that there is no ￿ nontrivial￿selec-
tion which is Bayesian consistent. Set-valued selections are interesting as there
is a large literature devoted to the ￿multiple priors￿model, initiated axiomati-
cally by Gilboa and Schmeidler [10]. In this model, the decision maker forms a
set of priors as her subjective belief. The subjective prior-by-prior updating rule
is often advocated as a method of updating ambiguous beliefs (though there is
not nearly as much consensus on this issue as there is in the subjective expected
utility case).
Let us rede￿ne the problem so as to include set-valued selections.
A prior selection problem consists of a nonempty subset of ￿, say, E,
and a set P 2 P (E). The domain of all prior selection problems will be written
X, and the domain of all prior selection problems (E;P) for which P 2 Pfs (E)
is denoted X fs.
8A prior selection rule is a function   : X !
S
E22￿n? P(E), such that for
all (E;P) 2 X,   (E;P) ￿ P. A full support prior selection rule takes as
domain X fs.
Similarly as before, for all nonempty E ￿ ￿, and for all nonempty F ￿ E,
for all P ￿ Pfs (E), the set PF ￿ Pfs (F) is given by
PF ￿
￿
p
p(F)
j2F : p 2 P
￿
:
Hence, PF is simply that set of probabilities that results from updating P prior-
by-prior.
A full support prior selection rule is Bayesian consistent if for all (E;P) 2
X fs, and for all nonempty F ￿ E,  
￿
F;PF￿
=   (E;P)
F.Also, a selection rule
  is proper if  (E;P) is a proper subset of P whenever P is non-singleton.
Corollary 1: Suppose that j￿j ￿ 3. Then there is no full support prior selec-
tion rule that is proper and Bayesian consistent.
Proof. Suppose, by means of contradiction, that a full support prior
selection rule exists that is both proper and Bayesian consistent, say,  . We
will derive a contradiction.
Note that for all (E;P) 2 X fs and for all F ￿ E,
 
￿
F; 
￿
F;PF￿￿
=  
￿
F;  (E;P)
F
￿
=   (E;  (E;P))
F ,
by a double application of Bayesian consistency. Thus, de￿ne  
1 (E;P) ￿
  (E;P), and for any n 2 N with n > 1, de￿ne  
n (E;P) ￿  
￿
E; 
n￿1 (E;P)
￿
.
Observe by induction that  
n is Bayesian consistent for all n.
For all (E;P) 2 X fs, de￿ne
 
￿ (E;P) ￿ lim
n!1
 
n (E;P).
(Note that this limit is well-de￿ned, as  
n (E;P) is a nested sequnce of convex,
compact sets. Clearly,  
￿ (E;P) 6= ?.)
We claim that  
￿ is Bayesian consistent. But this is trivial; for all (E;P) 2
X fs,
 
n ￿
E;PF￿
=  
n (E;P)
F ,
so that clearly
 
￿ ￿
E;PF￿
= lim
n!1
 
n ￿
E;PF￿
= lim
n!1
h
 
n (E;P)
F
i
=
h
lim
n!1  (E;P)
iF
=  
￿ (E;P)
F .
9The third equality here is a kind of continuity in projection and is simple to
verify.
There are now two possibilities. Either  
￿ is singleton valued, in which
case we obtain an immediate contradiction to our original theorem. Otherwise,
there exists some (E;P) 2 X fs for which  
￿ (E;P) is set valued. Clearly,
(E; 
￿ (E;P)) 2 X fs. Then   (E; 
￿ (E;P)) =  
￿ (E;P) (by de￿nition of  
￿),
and hence   is clearly not proper. Either way leads to a contradiction. ￿
The preceding corollary indicates that the most natural selection rule for a
multiple prior decision maker who uses the prior-by-prior updating rule is to
select the entire information set. In fact, the corollary can be used to show
that for all information sets P which are the convex hull of at most two points,
any Bayesian consistent full support prior selection rule must coincide with the
identity.
Corollary 2: Suppose that j￿j ￿ 3. Let   be a full support Bayesian
consistent prior selection rule, and let (E;P) 2 X fs such that P =
f￿p + (1 ￿ ￿)q : p;q 2 ￿(E), ￿ 2 [0;1]g. Then   (E;P) = P.
Proof. By Corollary 1, any full support Bayesian consistent prior selection
rule   cannot be proper; hence, there exists (E;P) 2 X fs for which P is non-
singleton, and for which   (E;P) = P. Since P is nonsingleton, jEj ￿ 2. If
jEj > 2, then there exist !1;!2 2 E and p1;p2 2 P for which
p1(!2)
p1(!1) <
p2(!2)
p2(!1).
Let F = f!1;!2g. Clearly, PF is nonsingleton. By Bayesian consistency,
 
￿
F;PF￿
=   (E;P)
F = PF. This argument establishes that we may without
loss of generality assume that jEj = 2.
Let !3 2 ￿nf!1;!2g, and let E0 = f!1;!3g. Let P0 2 Pfs (E0) be arbitrary.
We claim that   (E0;P0) = P0. If P0 is a singleton, this is obvious. Otherwise,
let p;q 2 P be extreme points of P for which p(!1) > q (!1), and let p0;q0 2 P0
be extreme points of P0 for which p0 (!1) > q0 (!1). Let G = f!1;!2;!3g, and
de￿ne p￿;q￿ 2 ￿fs (G) so that
p￿ (!1)
p￿ (!2)
=
p(!1)
p(!2)
,
p￿ (!1)
p￿ (!3)
=
p0 (!1)
p0 (!3)
,
q￿ (!1)
q￿ (!2)
=
q (!1)
q (!2)
,
and
q￿ (!1)
q￿ (!3)
=
q0 (!1)
q0 (!3)
.
Note that these linear inequalities in addition to the fact that p￿ and q￿ are
probability measures, uniquely determine p￿ and q￿. De￿ne Q 2 Pfs (G) as Q =
f￿p￿ + (1 ￿ ￿)q￿ : ￿ 2 [0;1]g. Clearly, QE = P and QE
0
= P0. Moreover, as
p 2   (E;P) and as   (E;P) =   (G;Q)
E, it must be that p￿ 2   (G;Q) (as p￿ is
10the unique element of Q for which p￿ (￿jG) = p). A similar argument establishes
that q￿ 2   (G;Q). Hence,   (G;Q) = Q, and by Bayesian consistency, we
conclude
P0
= QE
0
=   (G;Q)
E
0
=  
￿
E0;QE
0￿
=   (E0;P0).
It is now trivial to extend the argument to all problems (E;P) 2 X fs for which
jEj = 2 and P is of the required form. Now, let (E;P) 2 X fs be arbitrary,
where P is of the required form. It is clear that   (E;P) = P; otherwise, there
exists some F ￿ E such that jFj = 2 and   (E;P)
F is a proper subset of PF.
￿
This statement is quite strong. It says that for the special case in which
an information set is the convex hull of two priors, no subjective judgment is
permitted. In fact, the argument is easy to generalize to certain classes of
simplicies, but we will not provide such a statement.
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